On dogmatism and skepticism

Last time, PF Strawson argued that we can transcend the debate about the existence of the external world. We feel it to be so, but we can't give an argue for or against its existence. But this is not a satisfying answer, it seems to me.

On the one hand Strawson is right, that we can avoid the question in practices and in a day-to-day understanding of the world, but on the other hand Strawson is just choosing to avoid the issue.

Peter Unger, in "An Argument for Skepticism," argues that we should all be skeptics, and "nobody ever knows anything to be so." The argument goes like this:

THE SKEPTICAL ARGUMENT
1. If someone knows something to be so, then it is all right for the person to be absolutely certain that it is so.
2. It is never all right for anyone to be absolutely certain that anything is so.
3. So, nobody ever knows that anything is so.

I'll try to break down the argument. Let's look at the first premise. He thinks this first premise is uncontroversial. To know anything at all is really to be certain about it.

Of course, if knowing something is to be certain of it, then to be certain about something is to not allow any contrary facts that could challenge your original way of thinking. But if you think that then you are being dogmatic. So, a la premise 2, it is never all right to be certain that you can't admit contrary evidence.

So the conclusion follows: Nobody knows anything.

Again, I'll break down the premises and give my replies.

1. If someone knows something to be so, then it is all right for the person to be absolutely certain that it is so.
I think this premise is false. Unger gives examples to try to generate that at least in ordinary language, this premise is true. Here is one of his examples: "He really knew that it was raining, but he wasn't absolutely certain that it was." Unger writes: "Such a sentence can express no truth." I don't know that he's right about this. First, I don't know anyone who would utter this outside of the context of philosophy. Second, if someone did, I don't know that I find anything particular odious. It seems intelligible. Either way, I don't think any support can be mustered for his first premise. It has to do with the fact that the word 'knowledge' is an honorific term, and we call knowledge that which we are understand or attempting to understand, or we could ascribe the term to whatever we would like. And I'm sure if we did an ethnolinguistic analysis, it would have diverse uses that don't permit someone to think that it entails certainty, that that thinking is too high-minded.

2. It is never all right for anyone to be absolutely certain that anything is so.
Maybe this is true. Maybe he's right that this amounts to dogmatism. But just for the sake of argument, maybe practically speaking, it is okay to be absolutely certain that something is true. Even if we allow that in principle everything is fallible, that that everything we know is fallible (no contradiction, I don't think), maybe practically speaking we have to hold on to certain premises without which we could not understand anything at all. Perhaps the premise "My laptop appears to me in such a way that I cannot adequately describe to someone." Maybe for sanity's sake I have to believe it.

Anyway, anyway, what do you think? Do you think I'm right? Do you think Unger's right?